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Abstract
We study dynamic mechanisms for optimizing revenue in repeated auctions, that are robust
to heterogeneous forward-looking and learning behavior of the buyers. Typically it is assumed
that the buyers are either all myopic or are all infinite lookahead, and that buyers understand
and trust the mechanism. These assumptions raise the following question: is it possible to de-
sign approximately revenue optimal mechanisms when the buyer pool is heterogeneous? Facing
a heterogeneous population of buyers with an unknown mixture of k-lookahead buyers, myopic
buyers, no-regret-learners and no-policy-regret learners, we design a simple state-based mecha-
nism that achieves a constant fraction of the optimal achievable revenue.
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1 Introduction
Bundling increases revenue in commerce: this is a well known fact widely used in practice (e.g.,
Amazon often suggests a “frequently bought together” bundle while browsing many items). This
same principle is at the heart of why stateful repeated/dynamic auctions are significantly more
lucrative than one-shot auctions: stateful dynamic auctions profitably use the opportunity to bundle
across time. This revenue opportunity has inspired a series of recent works [PPPR16, ADH16,
MLTZ16, BML17, LP17, MLTZ18, ADMS18, BMSW18, BMLZ19] on designing dynamic auctions
satisfying various desired properties.
The ability to link auctions across time significantly expands the design space of auctions allow-
ing some exceedingly complex auctions. How does a buyer optimize when bidding in such auctions?
The standard and widely used notion in the literature of incentive compatibility (IC) requires that
the buyers understand these complicated auctions well, and have an “infinite lookahead”. I.e.,
they require the buyer to think about the consequences of their bid in the current round on all
future round utilities and optimize current round bid accordingly. In particular, as [ADMS18] note,
this assumes that the buyers understand the mechanism deeply enough to optimally respond, they
believe that their interactions with the seller will last for all future rounds accounted for when
computing utility, believe that the seller is indeed strictly following the advertised mechanism etc.
Numerous practical reasons make these assumptions far from true in reality: buyer’s computa-
tional limitations, inability to predict the future well enough, inability to trust a seller or understand
the exact auction that is run in a complex supply chain of auctions. A striking example of this is
the display ads market in Internet advertising. Given the number of ad exchanges, and the variety
of purchase mechanisms that are constantly evolving over time, buyers are often unable to trust or
verify whether a seller has stuck to an announced mechanism.
The consequence is that the seller faces a heterogeneous buyer population employing a large
spectrum of strategies to maximize their perceived utility. As [ADMS18] note, such a buyer could
behave myopically, or have a limited lookahead (i.e., a k-lookahead instead of infinite lookahead),
or be a learner that makes decisions only based on past performance of various bidding strategies
thereby completely disregarding the seller’s description/promises in the mechanism’s future.
The solution to tackling a heterogeneous buyer behavior cannot be a buyer-specific auction
that tailors the optimal auction for a given buyer behavior. Implementing such a discriminative
auction may be legally infeasible and also impractical (buyer’s behavior may even change over time).
Motivated by these observations, [ADMS18] considered the setting of a single seller repeatedly
interacting with a single buyer whose behavior (myopic/infinite lookahead/learner etc.) the seller
is a priori unaware of, and designed a single mechanism that simultaneously obtains a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue achievable against each potential buyer type. In this paper, we
study the following question:
Is there an n-buyer mechanism that is robust against heterogeneous buyer behaviors?
We consider a general setting with an arbitrary and unknown mixture of multiple heterogeneous
buyers. The challenges introduced by considering multiple buyers are discussed after describing
the setting and main result.
The setting. We study a repeated interaction between a single seller and n buyers over T rounds.
At the beginning of each round t = 1, 2, . . . , T , there is a single fresh good for sale whose private
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value vi,t ∈ V for buyer i is drawn, independently from other j 6= i and t′ 6= t, from a publicly
known distribution F with finite expectation µ. The buyer observes the valuation vit before making
a bid bit. The good for sale in round t has to be either allocated to one of the buyers or discarded
immediately. Each buyer’s valuation is additive across rounds. We consider a range of buyer
behaviors similar to [ADMS18], including myopic buyers, k-lookahead buyers, no-regret learners
and no-policy-regret learners. Formal definitions of these different buyer behaviors are provided in
Section 2.
We categorize as sophisticated buyers the buyers who are either k-lookahead for k ≥ ksoph = Θ(n)
or no-policy-regret learners, and naive buyers those who are myopic (0-lookahead) or no-regret
learners. Given a population with nsoph sophisticated and nnaive = n−nsoph naive buyers, a robust
mechanism aims to achieve close to maximum per-round revenue achievable from such a population,
without prior knowledge of which buyer is naive or sophisticated, or the values of nsoph and nnaive.
Upper bound on revenue. With only nnaive naive buyers, e.g. nnaive myopic buyers, it is impos-
sible in each round to get more than the optimal RevMye(nnaive) revenue in a single-round auction
obtainable from Myerson’s auction [Mye81a]. With only nsoph sophisticated buyers, it is impossible
to get more than Ev1,...,vnsoph∼F [maxi vi] revenue, as revenue is upper bounded by the maximum
value. It is easy to show that Ev1,...,vnsoph∼F [maxi vi] ≤ q
†
nsoph := Ev∼F
[
v|v ≥ F−1(1− 1/nsoph)
]
(see Appendix A). In a setting with nsoph and nnaive buyers, the total revenue achievable is thus
at most q†nsoph + Rev
Mye(nnaive) (see Appendix A). Motivated by this upper bound, we define the
following benchmark.
Definition 1. We call a mechanism (α, β)-robust if, for any per-round valuation distribution F ,
and for every value of nsoph ∈ [n] (and nnaive = n − nsoph), without knowing nsoph or nnaive, it
achieves an expected per round revenue of at least α · RevMye(nnaive) + β · q†nsoph − o(1).
Main result. We construct a mechanism that is Interim Individually Rational (IIR)1 and (Θ(1),Θ(1))-
robust. I.e., for every value of nsoph, nnaive, without knowing nsoph or nnaive, it achieves a per-round
revenue within a constant factor of the near optimal RevMye(nnaive) + q
†
nsoph − o(1) revenue. The
mechanism is a simple-to-implement first price auction with reserve price based on the current state
of buyers (where state is a succinct summary of the buyer’s history). With the display ads industry
moving to use first-price auctions [ada, dig, ade], this result is especially significant.
1.1 Overview of challenges and technical approach
The interactions between n buyers, with heterogeneous and unknown lookahead and learning be-
haviors, introduce multiple challenges compared to the single buyer setting studied in [ADMS18].
Firstly an equilibrium, which is a profile of mutually best responding strategies from all agents,
and a widely used predictor of a mechanism’s outcome, is unlikely to exist in our setting. Therefore it
is not possible to prove revenue guarantees by arguing about what revenue would be obtained in the
equilibrium outcome. Indeed, far from being able to pinpoint what our mechanism’s outcome will
be, we only guarantee what the mechanism’s outcome will not be, as long as all agents satisfy much
weaker notions of rationality like playing undominated strategies [BLP06] or no-regret strategies.
1[ADMS18] show that it is impossible to achieve such a high-revenue with per-round ex-post IR unless the buyer’s
lookahead is very high even in a single buyer setting, which rules that out as well in our setting.
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This aligns well with our assumptions of heterogeneity and distrust among buyers. With just this
guarantee of which outcomes will not occur in our mechanism, we are able to establish our strong
revenue guarantees. In contrast, in the 1-buyer setting of [ADMS18], there are no equilibrium
concerns: the single buyer simply best responds according to his utility function.
Another non-trivial challenge is that while proving results in undominated strategies, we have
to establish a given strategy for buyer i being dominated regardless of another buyer j’s strategies.
In particular j’s strategy could be an arbitrary function of the entire history of not only j’s own
bids and outcomes, but also those of i. This creates complex dependencies of buyer i’s future utility
on his bid today. For example, even if i bids truthfully according to his valuations today, he has to
consider a strategy of j that would bid very high and sabotage i in the future if it sees i bidding
beyond a certain bid in the current round. It requires careful design choices in the mechanism to
be able to guarantee certain buyer behavior under such complex side-effects of a buyer’s bid. Key
aspects of our mechanism are designed to allow lower bounding the utility of a buyer irrespective
of other buyers’ behavior. This ability is crucial for establishing our revenue guarantees.
We construct a state-based mechanism where sophisticated buyers remain in a good state yield-
ing high revenue, and where naive buyers bid as in an approximately revenue optimal one round
auction. The mechanism incentivizes sophisticated buyers to remain in this good state in spite of
the arbitrariness of other buyers’ responses, while also achieving high revenue. To guarantee high
utility to every sophisticated buyer in the good state, the mechanism temporarily “rests” buyers
who have recently been allocated a large number of items. Ignoring such buyers for a small number
of rounds guarantees some rounds for each buyer to enjoy positive utility and get the item as long
as they bid high enough. To do well against the benchmark of q†nsoph +Rev
Mye(nnaive) that extracts
the optimal revenue possible from every buyer category, the mechanism necessarily has to adapt
to the mixture of buyer population it is observing. Incorporating this adaptivity, and handling
the resulting complications in utility analysis are some further challenges that we handle in our
mechanism design and analysis.
1.2 Related work
There are several streams of literature related to our work in dynamic mechanism design.
Revenue maximization in dynamic auctions. The stream closest to our paper is the work on
revenue maximization in repeated auctions [PPPR16, ADH16, MLTZ16, BML17, LP17, MLTZ18,
ADMS18, BMSW18, BMLZ19]. The main difference of our work from all of these, with the excep-
tion of [ADMS18, BMSW18], is the notion of dynamic incentive compatibility which assumes that
all buyers are infinite lookahead, while we allow arbitrary mixtures of buyer attitudes. Agrawal et
al. [ADMS18] study the 1-buyer setting and design robust auctions when the buyers are k-lookahead
buyers or no-simple-regret learners or no-policy-regret learners. Braverman et al. [BMSW18] also
study the 1-buyer setting and design mechanisms to extract more than Myerson’s revenue when
the buyers follow no-simple-regret learning strategies, and in particular a subset of them called
mean-based bidding strategies.
Repeated interactions with evolving values. There is a large body of work on designing
mechanisms in repeated interactions when the buyers’ values evolve over time. See [BB84, Bes85,
CH00, Bat05, ES07, AS13, KLN13, PST14, BS15, CDKS16] for an overview of dynamic mechanisms
in such settings.
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Bargaining, durable goods monopolist and Coase conjecture. Unlike our setting where
the value is drawn independently in every round, there is a large body of literature in economics
that studies settings where the value is initially drawn from a distribution but remains fixed later on.
This setting can be motivated based on several applications including bargaining, durable goods
monopoly and behavior based discrimination. See [FVB06] for an excellent survey and references
therein for an overview of this area and [DPS15, ILPT17] for work in the theoretical computer
science literature.
Lookahead search. The study of k-lookahead search can be viewed in the context of bounded
rationality, as pioneered by Herb Simon [Sim55]. He argued that, instead of optimizing, agents
may apply a class of heuristics, termed satisfying heuristics in decision making. A natural choice
of such heuristics is restricting the search space of best-response moves. Lookahead search in
decision-making has been motivated and examined in great extent by the artificial intelligence
community [Nau83, dKaS92, SKN09]. Lookahead search is also related to the sequential thinking
framework in game theory [SW94]. More recently, [MTV12] study the quality of equilibrium
outcomes for look-ahead search strategies for various classes of games. They observe that the
quality of resulting equilibria increases in generalized second-price auctions, and duopoly games,
but not in other classes of games. No prior work studies dynamic mechanisms that are robust
against various lookahead search strategies.
2 Preliminaries
There are n buyers and a single item for auction at each of T sequential time steps. The value of
buyer i ∈ [n] at time step t ∈ [T ] for the item is denoted by vi,t and is drawn i.i.d. from a common
prior distribution F . The distribution F is known to all the buyers and the seller. The realization of
the value vi,t ∼ F is private and is visible only to buyer i. In each round t, every buyer makes a bid
bi,t. A buyer may use history of bids, allocation, and payments before round t along with its own
private valuations until round t, to decide the bid in round t. The seller uses the entire bid profile
bt = (b1,t, . . . , bn,t) at time t, along with history (bids, allocations, and payments) before time t to
decide allocation xi,t ∈ {0, 1} and payment pi,t ≥ 0 for each buyer, such that
∑n
i=1 xi,t ≤ 1.
More precisely, the bidding, payment, and allocation strategy space are defined as follows.
Definition 2. Let Ht−1 := (b1,x1,p1, . . . ,bt−1,xt−1,pt−1) denote the history of bids, allocation,
and payment before time t.
Definition 3 (Bidding strategy). Buyer i’s bids in round t are decided by functions bi,t = si(Ht−1, vi,t),
i.e. bids in round t are (possibly randomized) functions of history Ht−1 and buyer’s private valuation
in round t.
Definition 4 (Payment and allocation function). For each buyer i, payment and allocation in round
t are given by xi,t = xi(Ht−1,bt) and pi,t = pi(Ht−1,bt) of history Ht−1 and bid profile in round
t. Here, xi(Ht−1,bt) ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability of allocation to bidder i, and pi(Ht−1,bt) ≥ 0
denotes the bidder’s expected payment.
Definition 5 (Buyer’s realized utility). Buyer i’s realized utility in a round t is given by ui,t =
vi,txi,t − pi,t, i.e., it is the difference between valuation and payment if the good is allocated to the
buyer, and 0 otherwise. We often refer to this as simply the buyer’s utility in a round.
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Remark 1. Our current definition of history includes everything from past that can possibly be
revealed to buyers and can be relevant to a buyer’s bidding strategy. However, our results are not
tied to this particular definition of history. For example, instead of revealing the entire vector of bids
from the past, if we happen to just reveal the allocation and payment after each auction, that would
simply restrict the buyer’s strategy space further. Our arguments will hold as long as a buyer can
see their own bids, allocation, and payments in the past, and whether or not the good was allocated
in each round.
Remark 2. Technically, the history for buyer i should also include their own private valuations in
the past. However, since the valuations are generated independently in each round from a known
valuation distribution, are visible only to the buyer, and the buyer’s total utility is additive across
rounds, the past valuations are irrelevant for the buyer’s bidding strategy. Therefore, for simplicity,
we chose to eliminate them from the definition of buyer’s history.
Also define buyer i’s history, Hi,t−1 := (Ht−1, vi,1, . . . , vi,t−1). would things should be still fine:
this is because whatever be the strategies other buyers use, in a domination argument, we are going
to fix those strategies, and then show that a chosen strategy for a protagonist buyer is dominated
by another strategy.
In this paper, we focus on the first price auction mechanism which is defined by the following
specific allocation and payment function, with flexibility to choose the mechanism for setting a
“reserve price”.
Definition 6 (First price auction with reserve price). In a first price auction of a single good with
reserve price r, the seller observes the bids of participating buyers, and then allocates the good to
the buyer with highest bid if that bid is above or equal to the reserve price. The winning buyer’s
payment is equal to their bid.
2.1 Heterogeneous lookahead behavior
We define heterogeneous forward-looking behavior of buyers by considering buyers who may be
myopic or k-lookahead for different values of k. A myopic (k-lookahead) buyer is defined as a buyer
who optimizes her myopic (k-lookahead) utility in every round to decide the bid. Below, we give
precise definitions of these. Intuitively, myopic buyers optimize their current round utility, while
k-lookahead buyers (k ≥ 1) optimize their total expected utility over the current and next k rounds.
Definition 7 (Buyer’s myopic utility). Under bidding strategies s = {sj(·)}j=1,...,n, the myopic
utility of buyer i in round t, given private valuation vi,t and history Ht−1, is defined as
U
[t,t]
i (Ht−1, vi,t, s) = Evj,t∼F,j 6=i [vi,t · xi(Ht−1,bt)− pi(Ht−1,bt); bj,t = sj(Ht−1, vj,t),∀j]
Definition 8 (k-lookahead utility). Under bidding strategies s = {sj(·)}j=1,...,n, the k-lookahead
utility of buyer i in round t, given private valuation vi,t and history Ht−1, is defined as
U
[t,t+k]
i
(
Ht−1, vi,t, s
)
= Evj,t,j 6=i,v[t+1,t+k]
k∑
r=0
EW
[
U
[t+r,t+r]
i
(
(Ht−1,W[t,t+r−1]), vi,t+r, s
)]
whereWt+r denotes the vector of realized bids, allocation and payments in round t+r,W[t,t+r−1] :=
{Wt, . . . ,Wt+r−1}. And v[t+1,t+k] denotes the realizations of private valuations for all bidders from
time t+ 1 to t+ k, i.e., v[t+1,t+k] = {vτ,j, τ = t+ 1, . . . , t+ k, j = 1, . . . , n}.
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Undominated strategies. We provide revenue guarantees for our mechanism under an assump-
tion that all myopic or k-lookahead buyers play “undominated strategies”. This is a significantly
more robust notion of rationality than a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 9 (Dominated strategies for k-lookahead buyers.). In our setting for k-lookahead buyer,
a strategy s′i is a dominated strategy at time t under history Ht−1 if ∃si such that
∀vi,t, s−i : U [t,t+k]i
(
Ht−1, vi,t, si, s−i
)
≥ U [t,t+k]i
(
Ht−1, vi,t, s
′
i, s−i
)
∃vi,t, s−i : U [t,t+k]i
(
Ht−1, vi,t, si, s−i
)
> U
[t,t+k]
i
(
Ht−1, vi,t, s
′
i, s−i
)
For myopic buyers, above definition applies with k = 0.
2.2 Heterogeneous learning behavior
We consider learning buyers as those who do not know (or do not trust) the seller’s mechanism,
in particular the seller’s allocation and payment function, in order to be able to precisely evaluate
their current and future utility. Instead, a learning buyer uses the past outcomes to learn how to
bid. We formalize the notion of learning buyer using the experts learning framework [FS95]. A
learning buyer uses a learning algorithm in order to learn to bid in a way that its total utility is
close to that achieved by the best single expert among a set of expert bidding strategies E. (Recall
from Definition 3, a bidding strategy is an arbitrary mapping from history and valuation to bid).
We formalize different levels of learning sophistication among buyers by considering two classes of
learning algorithms, as described below.
No-regret learner: A no-regret learning buyer i uses a no-regret learning algorithm to decide
bid bi,t at time t. The ‘reward’ (in no-regret learning terminology) at time t on making a bid bi,t = b
is given by the buyer’s tth-round utility, determined by the mechanism’s output depending on other
buyers’ bids as well as the history. That is, on making a bid b, the learner’s reward at time t is
given by a function gt(b) defined as
gt(b) := vi,txi(Ht−1, b,b−i,t)− pi(Ht−1, b,b−i,t)
Regret is defined as the difference between buyer’s total reward and that of the best expert f ∈ E
in hindsight :
Regret(T ) = max
f∈E
T∑
t=1
gt(f(Ht−1, vi,t))−
T∑
t=1
gt(bi,t) (1)
A no-regret learning buyer uses a bidding strategy such the above regret is o(T ) under every tra-
jectory of bids and private valuations. Note that such a learner is solving an adversarial bandit
problem, since the learner only observes the value of function ui,t(·) on the bid bi,t used by the
buyer. When the number of experts N is finite, there are efficient and natural algorithms (e.g.,
EXP3 algorithm based on multiplicative weight updates [ACBFS03]) that achieve O(
√
NT logN)
regret.
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No-policy-regret learner: This more sophisticated buyer uses a no-policy-regret learning al-
gorithm (following definition of policy regret in [ADT12]). An important distinction from the
definition of regret in the previous paragraph is that now the total reward of the best expert must
be evaluated over the trajectory of adversarial inputs (i.e., history and other buyers’ bids) in re-
sponse to the bids made by the expert. To make explicit the dependence of tth utility reward on
the trajectory of past decisions through history of outcomes and other buyers’ strategic response,
let us denote the reward function for round t as gt(b,Ht−1). Let sj,t denote the strategy used by
buyer j 6= i at time t and vj,t is the private valuation of buyer j. Then, the learner’s expected
reward in round t is defined as:
gt(b,Ht−1) := Evi∼F [vixi(Ht−1, b,b−i,t)− pi(Ht−1, b,b−i,t) where bj,t := sj,t(Ht−1, vj,t)].
Then, for any sequence of other buyers’ valuations v−i,t and strategies s−i,t for t = 1, . . . , T policy-
regret of such a buyer is defined against the best expert f ∈ E in hindsight:
Policy-Regret(T ) = max
f∈E
T∑
t=1
gt(f(H
′
t−1, vi,t),H
′
t−1)−
T∑
t=1
gt(bi,t,Ht−1) (2)
where bi,t denotes the bid made by buyer at time t, f(H
′
i,t, vi,t) denotes the bid that would be
made by the expert under counterfactual trajectory, H ′1, . . . ,H
′
T denotes the (possibly randomized)
counterfactual trajectory of history that would be observed in response to using the bids suggested
by the expert, instead of the original bids bi,t. A no-policy-regret learning buyer uses a bidding
strategy such that the above policy-regret is guaranteed to be o(T ) under any sequence of other
buyers’ valuations vi,t and strategies s−i,t for t = 1, . . . , T . See Appendix F for a short note on the
existence of policy regret learning algorithms.
3 Repeated First Price Auction Mechanism
Algorithms 1-3 contain the formal description of our mechanism. We design a dynamic first price
auction mechanism that is conducted in sequential rounds t = 1, . . . , T . In every round, the
mechanism partitions the n buyers into two categories: good state buyers and bad state buyers.
All buyers start in good state. The buyers may be moved by the mechanism from good state to
bad state over time but once in bad state, a buyer remains there for the remaining rounds.2 In any
round, the current set of buyers in good state and bad state are denoted by G and B respectively.
The mechanism uses these states to track buyer behavior and incentivize lookahead or learning
buyers to stay in a good state, in order to extract the desired revenue from both sophisticated and
naive buyers.
The mechanism proceeds in epochs, each consisting of multiple rounds. In a given round, the
mechanism either conducts a first price auction with a reserve price among the good state buyers,
or a first price auction with a (different) reserve price among the bad state buyers. Specifically, an
epoch consists of E := 2Hmg(1−δ)(1−ρ) = O(mg) rounds where H =
4 log(1/ǫ)
δ2
and mg = max(1, |G|) is the
number of good state buyers in the beginning of the epoch. During an epoch, the mechanism first
2One can think of the time period T as the number of auctions in a day, and reset all buyers to good state at the
beginning of the next day when another T auctions are run. Alternatively it also possible to design a mechanism
that permits the movement back to a good state for initial few rounds, but for clarity in exposition, so we choose to
not do that here.
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runs the Bad-State-Auctions subroutine (Algorithm 2), which consists of ρE rounds of auctions
among bad state buyers. It then runs theGood-State-Auctions subroutine (Algorithm 3), which
consists of (1− ρ)E rounds of auctions among good state buyers. Some good state buyers may be
moved to bad state during the Good-State-Auctions. The reserve prices rg and rb for good and
bad state auctions depend on parameters mg,mb ∈ [n] which are set at the beginning of an epoch,
and remain fixed throughout an epoch.
Algorithm 1 Robust repeated first price auction among n buyers
Input: horizon T , parameters ρ, ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1), thresholds H = 4 log(1/ǫ)
δ2
Initialize all buyers’ state to the good state: G = {1, . . . , n} and B = {}
Repeat until horizon of T rounds is reached:
for epochs ℓ = 1, 2, . . . , do
Set mb = max(n/2, |B|), mg = max(1, |G|), E := 2Hmg(1−δ)(1−ρ)
Run Bad-State-Auctions among buyers in B for Eb = ρE rounds
Run Good-State-Auctions among buyers in G for Eg = (1− ρ)E rounds
(this may update B and G)
In the first Eb = ρE rounds of the epoch, Bad-State-Auctions runs a first price auction with
reserve price rb among bad state buyers in B, as described in Algorithm 2. Here rb := pmb − ǫnqmb ,
with pmb = F
−1(1 − θmb), θm being the probability that a buyer wins in a Myerson auction with
m buyers (e.g., see [Mye81b]); and qmb := F
−1(1 − 1/mb) the mthb quantile. In fact, for any m,
θm ≤ 1m , so that pmb ≥ qmb and rb ≥ (1− ǫn)pmb ≥ (1− ǫn)qmb .
Algorithm 2 Bad-State-Auctions: first price auction among bad state buyers
Input: buyers B, number of rounds Eb, and parameter mb ∈ [n]
for Eb rounds do
Auction: Run a first price auction with reserve price rb = pmb − ǫnqmb among buyers B.
Let {bj}j∈B be the set of bids received.
if maxj∈B bj ≥ rb then
Allocate the good to buyer i = argmaxj∈B bj with highest bid and charge bi
In each of the remaining Eb = (1 − ρ)E rounds of the epoch, the Good-State-Auctions
subroutine (Algorithm 3) runs a first price auction with reserve price rg := (1−ǫ)q†mg among buyers
currently in good state (i.e., buyers in G). Here, q†m := Ev∼F [v|v ≥ qm], with qm = F−1(1− 1/m).
The Good-State-Auctions subroutine uses a third state, called the rest state, which is used
to temporarily rest a buyer, i.e., not allow that buyer to participate in the remaining auctions in
that epoch. The set of buyers in the rest state in the current round is denoted by R. In each round,
after the auction a buyer may be moved from good state to either bad or rest state in the following
ways:
• The mechanism considers the number of uncleared auctions U so far in this epoch, i.e., the
number of auctions during this instance of Good-State-Auctions, where all the participat-
ing bids were lower than reserve price. If this number is greater than or equal to
mgH
(1−δ) , then
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any good state buyer (i ∈ G) whose bid bi in this round was smaller than the reserve price,
is moved to bad state.
• For every buyer currently in good state (i ∈ G), the mechanism considers the number of
allocations Ai received by the buyer so far in this epoch. If this is ≥ H, the buyer is moved
to the rest state.
In the first step, the mechanism checks if the number of uncleared auctions is significantly above
the statistically expected number. And, if so, from there on, the mechanism punishes every par-
ticipating buyer who bids below reserve price. This step is aimed to ensure that the lookahead
buyers are incentivized to bid above reserve price in rounds where their private valuations are high
enough. To understand the intuition behind the second step, observe that given the epoch length
of O(mg), statistically, any given buyer is expected to have the highest valuation among mg buyers
for roughly a constant number of steps in every epoch. Thus, the second step is intended to ensure
that a buyer does not win too many auctions (perhaps at cost of negative immediate utility for
some rounds) in order to deprive other buyers of allocations and potentially cause the mechanism
to move them to bad state.
Algorithm 3 Good-State-Auctions: first price auction among good state buyers
Input: buyers G , number of rounds Eg, parameters ǫ, ρ, δ ∈ (0, 1) and mg ∈ [n], threshold H
Initialize state R = {} and counters U = 0 and, for all i ∈ G, Ai = 0
for Eg rounds do
Auction: Run a first price auction with reserve price rg = (1− ǫ)q†mg among buyers in G
Let i = argmaxj∈G bj be the buyer with highest bid
if bi ≥ rg then
Allocate the good to buyer i and charge bi
Update the number of allocations to buyer i: Ai = Ai + 1
else
Update the number of uncleared auctions: U = U + 1
Move buyers between states:
if U ≥ mgH1−δ then move buyers in G with bid lower than rg to B:
Update B = B ∪ {i ∈ G : bi < rg} and G = G\{i : bi < rg}
if Ai ≥ H then move buyer i to rest state:
Update R = R ∪ {i} and G = G\{i}
Move all rest state buyers back to good state: G = G ∪R
4 Revenue Analysis: Main Result
Our main result is that the mechanism presented in the previous section extracts a constant factor
of optimal revenue q†nsoph +Rev
Mye(nnaive) from nsoph sophisticated buyers and nnaive naive buyers.
To formally state this result, we first define the sophisticated buyers and naive buyers. This involves
defining the set of experts used by learning buyers. In general, an expert bidding strategy can be
any arbitrary mapping from historical information and current valuation to bid. However, being
able to learn the best strategy in such an arbitrary set makes too strong an assumption on learning
abilities of the buyer. In fact, it is sufficient for our mechanism to have learning buyers that can
compete against a restricted set of experts, as defined below.
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Definition 10 (Expert set E). Let hi,t−1 be a fixed size projection of history Ht−1 containing the
following information: the buyer i’s state (whether it is bad or good/rest) in round t, the number
of buyers in good and bad state, and the number of uncleared auctions so far in the current epoch.
Let H denote the set of (2×n×Emax) possible values of hi,t,∀i, t. Then, set of experts E is defined
as mappings from this projected history and current valuation to a bid, i.e., E = {f : H× V¯ → V¯ }.
Here, V¯ is a discretized (to arbitrary accuracy) range of valuations, in order to obtain a finite set
of experts. Given hi,t−1, and valuation vi,t, an expert strategy f ∈ E suggests bid bi,t = f(hi,t−1, vi,t)
to buyer i in round t.
We are now ready to formally define sophisticated and naive buyers.
Definition 11 (Sophisticated and Naive buyers). Sophisticated buyers are defined as the buyers
who are either k-lookahead, for k ≥ 80 log(ǫ−1)nǫ3(1−ǫ)2(1−ρ) = Θ(n), or no-policy-regret learners against some
set of experts containing E. Na¨ıve buyers are defined as buyers who are either myopic, or are
no-regret learners against some set of experts containing E.
Theorem 1. Assuming all myopic and k-lookahead buyers play undominated strategies, the expected
per round revenue of the mechanism described in Algorithm 1-3, with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), δ = ǫ, ρ ≤ ǫ(1−ǫ)412 ,
is at least
Θ(1)
(
q†nsoph +Rev
Mye(nnaive)
)
− o(1),
where nsoph, nnaive is the number of sophisticated and naive buyers, respectively. More precisely, the
expected per round revenue is at least
(1− ǫ)1
4
· q†nsoph +
ρ(1− ǫ)
2
(
1− 1
e
)
RevMye(nnaive)− o(1)
where q†n = Ev∼F [v|v ≥ qn], with qn = F−1(1 − 1/n) being the nth quantile for the valuation
distribution, and q†0 = 0. Rev
Mye(n) is the optimal revenue in a single-item auction with n buyers.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of four parts. We first give revenue and utility bounds that
apply to any buyer, then characterize undominated strategies for myopic/lookahead buyers, and
no-regret strategies for learners, and finally combine these parts. We give an overview of each part
here and defer lemma statements and their proofs to the appendix.
General revenue and utility analysis (Appendix B). We first establish in Lemma 1 that, ifG
is the set of good state buyers at the end of an epoch, then the expected revenue fromGood-State-
Auctions during that epoch is at least |G|Hrg. This lower bound on revenue from good state
buyers is obtained by observing that each buyer who ends an epoch in good state must have either
been allocated the item (and paid at least rg) during at least H rounds of this epoch to be moved
to a rest state, or must have bid at least rg at each round where U ≥ mgH/(1−δ). In Lemma 2, we
show that if the bid of bad state buyers B is at least rb when their value is larger than rb, then the
expected revenue per round of Bad-State-Auctions is at least (1− ǫ)(1− 1/e) |B|mbRev
Mye(mb).
A main part of the overall revenue analysis is to argue that sophisticated buyers are incentivized
to remain in good state, irrespectively of other buyers’ bids. To show this, we establish a lower
bound on the utility achievable in good state and an upper bound on the utility achievable in bad
state. To establish the lower bound, we analyze a strategy called the good strategy sg (Definition 12)
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that never moves a buyer to the bad state. When U < mgH/(1 − δ), sg bids rg = (1 − ǫ)q†mg if
vi ≥ qmg , and 0 otherwise. When U ≥ mgH/(1− δ), sg bids rg. In Lemma 3, we lower bound the
expected utility obtained by strategy sg over an epoch. The crucial component of the mechanism
which allows this bound is temporarily moving buyers who have already been allocated enough
(more than statistically expected) number of items to the rest state. This temporarily removes
such buyers from good state auctions, and guarantees to any buyer i ∈ G a minimum number of
rounds in each epoch where i can get the item if it bids above the reserve price. In Lemma 4, we
upper bound the expected utility achievable by any bad state buyer.
Undominated strategies for buyers with heterogeneous lookahead attitudes (Appendix C).
The main lemma for this part (Lemma 5) shows that a k-lookahead buyer, for k large enough, never
enters the bad state. To show this, we consider a round where a buyer i ∈ G faces the threat to
be sent to a bad state if it bids below rg. In Lemma 7, we lower bound the k-lookahead utility
obtained by strategy sg, which maintains i in good state, in such a round. Lemma 6 then upper
bounds the k-lookahead utility of any strategy bidding below rg in such a round, which would send
the buyer to a bad state. Lemma 5 then combines these two bounds to show that any strategy
that sends a k-lookahead buyer to a bad state is dominated by strategy sg. A main difficulty in
combining these two lemmas is that the epoch lengths and the reserve prices vary at each epoch,
and we need to compare utilities from different epochs. We show in Lemma 9 that a myopic buyer
bids at least the reserve price rb when it has value at least rb in bad state.
Strategies of no-regret buyers with heterogeneous learning behaviors (Appendix D).
We show in Lemma 10 that a buyer that goes to a bad state has high policy-regret compared to an
expert that plays strategy sg, which implies that a no-policy regret learner must remain in good
state in all but o(T ) rounds. A difficulty here is to argue that there is gap between the utility
a buyer going to a bad state and the utility of an expert following the good strategy, where the
utilities are evaluated over different trajectories of adversarial inputs. In Lemma 11, we give a
condition under which a no-regret learner in bad state must bid at least the reserve price rb when
its value is larger than rb in all but o(T ) rounds. An important subtlety for no-regret learners is
that due to the other buyers, a learner is not guaranteed to win a bad state auction and obtain
positive utility when it bids at least rb.
Main result (Appendix E). We combine the three previous parts to lower bound the revenue
achieved by the mechanism and obtain Theorem 1. A last non-trivial argument needed is that if a
naive buyer remains in good state, we obtain at least a much revenue from that buyer as if it was
in bad state, regardless of how many buyers are in good and bad state.
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A Proof for Revenue Upper Bound
Upper bound on revenue. In a setting with just nnaive naive buyers and no other buyers (for
e.g., just nnaive myopic buyers), it is impossible to get more than Rev
Mye(nnaive) per round, i.e.,
the optimal revenue in a single-round auction obtainable from Myerson’s auction [Mye81a]. In a
setting with just nsoph sophisticated buyers (and no other buyers), it is impossible to get more than
Ev1∼F,...,vnsoph∼F
[
max(v1, . . . , vnsoph)
]
as revenue is upper bounded by the maximum valuation. It is
easy to show that Ev1∼F,...,vnsoph∼F
[
max(v1, . . . , vnsoph)
] ≤ q†nsoph = Ev∼F [v|v ≥ F−1(1− 1/nsoph)].
To see this, note that because a buyer has the largest value among nsoph buyers (with ties broken
uniformly) with probability 1nsoph ,
Ev1∼F,...,vnsoph∼F
[
max(v1, . . . , vnsoph)
]
=
nsoph∑
i=1
1
nsoph
Ev1∼F,...,vnsoph∼F
[
vi|vi = max(v1, . . . , vnsoph)
]
.
Now, since the expected value of a buyer conditioned on an event happening with probability
1/nsoph is at most Ev∼F
[
v|v ≥ F−1(1− 1/nsoph)
]
= q†nsoph , the inequality follows.
Now, combining these, we claim that in a setting with nsoph sophisticated buyers and nnaive
naive buyers, the total revenue achievable is at most q†nsoph + Rev
Mye(nnaive). Indeed, if we were
able to achieve more than this, then either the revenue contribution from the sophisticated buyers
is more than q†nsoph or the naive buyers is more than Rev
Mye(nnaive) — neither of this is possible
because if that was true then in a setting with just the nsoph sophisticated buyers or just the nnaive
naive buyers we could have simulated the rest of the buyers by adding dummy buyers and discarded
the revenue contributed by dummy buyers to obtain more revenue than q†nsoph or Rev
Mye(nnaive).
B General Revenue and Utility Analysis
The analysis shows that, up to constant factors, the mechanism extracts the optimal q†nsoph +
RevMye(nnaive) revenue from nsoph sophisticated buyers and nnaive na¨ıve buyers. In Section B.1,
we first provide separate bounds on the revenue from good and bad state buyers in Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 respectively.
The main part of the analysis is to argue that sophisticated buyers, either k-lookahead buyers
for large enough k or no-policy-regret learners, are incentivized to remain in the good state. We
show that any strategy which leads to the bad state is a dominated strategy for k-lookahead buyers
(and has large regret for no-policy regret learners). To show this, in Section B.2, we provide lower
and upper bounds on the utility achievable by a buyer in the good and bad state in Lemma 3 and
Lemma 4, respectively.
These utility bounds are used Section C and Section D to argue that (a) k-lookahead buyers
for large enough k (Lemma 5) and no-policy-regret buyers (Lemma 10) have incentive to stay in
good state for most rounds, and (b) in bad state, myopic buyers (Lemma 9) and learning buyers
(Lemma 11) have incentive to bid above reserve price when their private valuation is large enough.
Finally in Section E, we combine all these observations to lower bound the revenue achieved
given a pool of heterogeneous lookahead and learning buyers, and prove our main result.
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B.1 Revenue analysis from good and bad state auctions
We give bounds on the revenue achieved by Good-State-Auctions and Bad-State-Auctions.
These are general bounds which hold for both lookahead and learning buyers.
Lemma 1. Let G be the set of good state buyers at the end of an epoch. Then, total expected
revenue from Good-State-Auctions during that epoch is at least |G|H(1 − ǫ)q†mg .
Proof. Let G be the good state buyers at the end of an epoch of the mechanism. Consider the
round during that epoch at which the number U of uncleared auctions reaches
mgH
1−δ . Such a step
must exist because total number of allocations is at most mgH (mg is the number of good state
buyers at the beginning of that epoch) but the number of good state auctions in this epoch is
(1−ρ)E = 2mgH1−δ . Suppose that at this round, some buyer in G is in good state (i.e., hasn’t yet been
moved to rest state). Every such buyer must bid rg or above in each of the remaining rounds of the
epoch, until that buyer is moved to the rest state; otherwise, the mechanism would have pushed this
buyer to a bad state and this buyer would not be in G at the end of this epoch. This means that
before the end of the epoch: either all of the buyers in G were moved to rest state so that revenue
was at least |G|Hrg; or all the remaining auctions (after the number of uncleared auctions reached
the threshold) cleared because some bid exceeded reserve price, so that the number of uncleared
auctions is bounded by the threshold
mgH
1−δ , and the number of goods sold through the good state
auctions is at least (1− ρ)E − mgH1−δ ≥ mgH, giving revenue of at least rg|G|H.
Revenue from bad state auctions.
Lemma 2. Let B be set of bad state buyers in the beginning of an epoch. Suppose that in every
round of Bad-State-Auctions during this epoch where the set of buyers i ∈ B with vi,t ≥ pmb is
non-empty, at least one such buyer is guaranteed to bid rb or more. Then, total expected revenue
from that epoch is at least (1−ǫ)(1− 1e )· |B|mb Rev
Mye(mb)Eb, where expectation is taken over valuations
vi,t, i ∈ B, t ∈ Eb.
Proof. Recall rb = pmb − ǫnqmb ≥ (1 − ǫ)pmb . If in every round, among buyers in bad state with
valuation above pmb , at least one buyer is guaranteed to bid above r
b ≥ (1 − ǫ)pmb , then the
mechanism will get at least (1 − ǫ) fraction of the expected revenue of a posted-price mechanism
with a uniform price pmb among buyers in B. Since θmb is the probability of a buyer winning an mb
buyer Myerson’s auction with iid values, where mb ≥ |B|, this revenue (see for example [CHMS10])
is at least (1− ǫ)(1− 1/e) |B|mb ·Rev
Mye(mb) for every round in bad state auctions.
B.2 Utility analysis from good and bad state buyers
We give bounds on the utility achievable by a buyer in a good state and bad state. These are
general bounds which hold both for buyers with lookahead attitudes and the buyers with learning
behaviors. Further, they hold irrespective of other buyers’ bids.
Lower bound on the utility achievable by a good state buyer. We lower bound the utility
achievable by a buyer in the good state by describing a simple strategy which (1) never moves
a buyer to the bad state and (2) achieves high utility. We call this strategy the ‘good strategy’,
denoted by sg, and defined as follows.
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Definition 12 (Good strategy sg). In any round of Good-State-Auctions, a buyer i using
good strategy sg bids in the following manner. If the number of the uncleared past auctions in the
current epoch is U < mgH/(1− δ), bid rg = (1− ǫ)q†mg if the current valuation vi ≥ qmg , and bid 0,
otherwise. If U ≥ mgH/(1 − δ), set the bid equal to the reserve price rg irrespective of the current
valuation.
Observe that the good strategy is defined in such a manner that a buyer using this strategy for
all rounds of Good-State-Auctions is guaranteed to either always stay in the good state or be
moved to the rest state, i.e., is guaranteed to be never pushed to a bad state. Next, we now lower
bound the utility of a buyer using this strategy.
Lemma 3. Consider a buyer in good state at the beginning of an epoch. Irrespective of the other
buyers’ bids, the expected utility of strategy sg over that epoch is at least
ǫ(1− ǫ)q†mgH.
Proof. Consider an epoch where a good state buyer follows strategy sg for all rounds in Good-
State-Auctions. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 1, observe that the number of uncleared
auction in such an epoch must reach 1(1−δ)mgH before the end of this epoch. Let e1 denote the
event that the buyer is still in good state when the number of uncleared auction in that epoch
reaches 1(1−δ)mgH, i.e., the buyer did not get enough allocations to go to rest state. Since the
buyer bids rg = (1 − ǫ)q†mg whenever v ≥ qmg , probability Pr(e1) of this event happening is
bounded by the probability of the following event: let X1,X2, . . . ,Xr be r =
mgH
1−δ independent
samples from distribution F ; then consider event
∑r
i=1 I(Xi ≥ F−1(1 − 1/mg)) ≤ H. Since
E[
∑r
i=1 I(Xi ≥ F−1(1− 1/mg))] = rmg , Therefore, using Chernoff bounds, probability of this event
is bounded as Pr(e1) ≤ e−δ2H/2. Under event e1, the buyer may end up with negative utility (as
the strategy of always bidding reserve price will kick in), which can be at worst −rgH from this
epoch. Otherwise, the buyer will get H allocations, each from some rounds where v ≥ qmg . Since
the buyer wins them at reserve price, and the space of other buyers’ bidding strategies consist only
of functions that are independent of this buyer’s bid and valuation, the expected utility from each
of these H goods is E[v − (1− ǫ)q†mg |v ≥ qmg ] ≥ ǫq†mg .
Then, expected utility from each of of the next K − 1 epochs is at least:
(1− Pr(e1))Hǫq†mg + Pr(e1)H(−rg)
≥ (1− e−δ2H/2)ǫq†mgH − e−δ
2H/2(1− ǫ)q†mgH
(substituting δ =
√
4 log(1/ǫ)
H
) ≥ ǫq†mgH − ǫ2(1− 2ǫ)q†mgH
≥ ǫ(1− ǫ)q†mgH (3)
Upper bound on utility achievable by a bad state buyer.
Lemma 4. Consider a buyer in bad state at the beginning of an epoch. Irrespective of the other
buyers’ bids, its expected utility over the epoch is at most
(1 + ǫ)
ρE
mb
q†mb .
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Proof. For an epoch of length E , the number of rounds of Bad-State-Auctions during an epoch
is ρE . During a bad state auction, the utility of a buyer with value v is at most (v − rb)I(v ≥ rb).
Thus, the total expected utility of a buyer in bad state over the epoch is at most
ρE · E[(v − rb)I(v ≥ rb)]
= ρE · E[(v − rb)I(v ≥ pmb)] + ρE · E[(v − rb)I(pmb ≥ v ≥ pmb −
ǫ
n
qmb)]
≤ ρE · E[(v − rb)I(v ≥ qmb)] + ρE ·
( ǫ
n
qmb
)
≤ ρE 1
mb
(1 + ǫ)q†mb
where the first and second inequality were obtained using that rb = pmb− ǫnqmb , and qmb ≤ pmb . The
first part of third inequality used v ≤ v−rb, and by definition q†mb = E[v|v ≥ qmb ], Pr(v ≥ qmb) = 1mb .
The second part used qmb ≤ q†mb , n ≥ mb.
C Undominated Strategies for Buyers with Heterogeneous Looka-
head Attitudes
We characterize the undominated strategies of myopic and lookahead buyers. The main lemma in
this section, Lemma 5, argues that a k-lookahead buyer, for k large enough, playing an undominated
strategy never enters a bad state. Lemma 9 then shows that in a bad state, myopic buyers playing
undominated strategies always bid at least the reserve price rb when their value is at least rb.
Lookahead buyers. We previously showed in Lemma 1 that we obtain the optimal |G|q†mg
revenue from buyers in a good state. In addition to obtaining the optimal revenue, we show that
the mechanism also incentivizes lookahead buyers to stay in a good state. We denote the maximum
length of an epoch by Emax = maxmg 2Hmg(1−δ)(1−ρ) = 2Hn(1−δ)(1−ρ) .
Lemma 5. A k-lookahead buyer with k ≥ 10ǫ(1−ǫ)Emax playing an undominated strategy never enters
the bad state.
The mechanism moves a buyer i to the bad state if a buyer bids lower than rg in a round of
Good-State-Auctions where the number of previous uncleared auctions is U ≥ mgH/(1−δ). We
show that during a round of Good-State-Auctions with U ≥ mgH/(1−δ), for every k-lookahead
buyer i in good state G, bidding below the reserve price rg is a dominated strategy.
A strategy which dominates bidding below the reserve price in such a case is the good strategy
sg from Definition 12. Recall that if U < mgH/(1 − δ), this strategy bids rg = (1 − ǫ)q†mg if the
valuation vi is greater than or equal to qmg , and 0, otherwise; if the number of uncleared past
auctions in this epoch is 1(1−δ)mgH or more, it sets the bid equal to the reserve price r
g for every
value. Under this strategy, the buyer is guaranteed to always stay in good state or be moved to
rest state, i.e., guaranteed to never be pushed to a bad state.
Lemma 6 and Lemma 7 upper and lower bound the k-lookahead utility achieved by bidding
below the reserve price and by playing sg during a round of Good-State-Auctions with U ≥
mgH/(1 − δ). Then, by combining these bounds, we get that bidding below the reserve price in
such a situation is dominated and obtain Lemma 5. We denote by ℓ(t) the epoch at which step t
occurs.
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Lemma 6. Consider a round t during Good-State-Auctions where the number of previous
uncleared auctions is U ≥ nH/(1− δ). Then, for any buyer i ∈ G and strategy si which bids lower
than rg in this round,
U
[t,t+k]
i (Ht−1, vi,t, s) ≤
2(1 + ǫ)ρH
(1− ρ)(1− δ)
ℓ(t+k)∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
mjg
mjb
· q†
mj
b
.
Proof. By the definition of Good-State-Auctions, bidder i ∈ Gt is moved to bad state at the
end of step t if it bids lower than rg. Since bidder i bids lower than the reserve price, its utility in
this round is 0.
Therefore, under this strategy, irrespective of the bids used in the rounds after t, the buyer i’s
k-lookahead utility in round t is at most the bad state utility over ℓ(t+ k)− ℓ(t)− 1 epochs, which
by Lemma 4, is at most
U
[t,t+k]
i (Ht−1, vi,t, s) ≤
ℓ(t+k)∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
(1 + ǫ)
ρEj
mjb
q†
mj
b
≤ 2(1 + ǫ)ρH
(1− ρ)(1 − δ)
ℓ(t+k)∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
mjg
mjb
· q†
mj
b
.
Next, we lower bound the k-lookahead utility achieved with the good strategy sg in the same
situation.
Lemma 7. Consider a round t during Good-State-Auctions where the number of previous
uncleared auctions is U ≥ nH/(1− δ). Then, for any buyer i ∈ G playing strategy si = sg,
U
[t,t+k]
i (Ht−1, vi,t, s) ≥ (1− ǫ)H

−q†
m
ℓ(t)
g
+ ǫ
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg

 .
Proof. The utility from bad state auctions is always non-negative, so we ignore that for the lower
bound. Now, since any buyer can be allocated at most H items in an epoch, the maximum
payment in the remaining rounds of this epoch is at most rgH, lower bounding the utility by
−rgH = −q†
mℓg
(1 − ǫ)H. Now, consider the utility in any of the next ℓ(t + k) − ℓ(t) − 2 epochs.
The buyer always remains in good state or rest state in each of the next ℓ(t+ k)− ℓ(t)− 2 epochs.
Combining the above argument with Lemma 3, the k-lookahead utility of the new strategy is at
least:
−q†
m
ℓ(t)
g
(1− ǫ) ·H︸ ︷︷ ︸
minimum utility from the rest of this epoch
+ ǫ(1− ǫ)H
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg︸ ︷︷ ︸
minimum utility over next ℓ(t+ k)− ℓ(t) − 2 epochs
The third and last lemma needed for the proof of Lemma 5 is used to combine the two pre-
vious lemmas and argue that Good-State-Auctions lead higher utility for a buyer then Bad-
State-Auctions. This lemma will also be used to argue that Good-State-Auctions give higher
revenue.
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Lemma 8. For any mg,mb such that 1 ≤ mg ≤ n and n/2 ≤ mb ≤ n, then
1
mg
q†mg ≥ ·
1
n
q†n/2 ≥
1
2
· 1
mb
q†mb .
Proof. First, for any 1 ≤ m1 ≤ m2 ≤ n, we have
1
m1
q†m1 ≥
1
m2
q†m2 .
We obtain
1
mg
q†mg ≥
1
max(n/2,mg)
q†max(n/2,mg) ≥
1
n
q†n/2 ≥
1
2
· 1
n/2
q†n/2 ≥
1
2
· 1
mb
q†mb
where the first inequality is since mg ≤ max(n/2,mg), the second is since q†i is increasing in i, and
the last since n/2 ≤ mb.
We now prove that entering a bad state is a dominated strategy for lookahead buyers by com-
paring the bounds obtained by Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
Proof of Lemma 5. With k ≥ 10ǫ(1−ǫ)Emax, we have
∑ℓ(t+k)−1
j=ℓ(t)+1 Ej ≥ 8ǫ(1−ǫ)Emax. Comparing the
k-lookahead utility bounds obtained in Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, the strategy sg is dominating if
(1− ǫ)H

−q†
m
ℓ(t)
g
+ ǫ
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg

 ≥ 2(1 + ǫ)ρH
(1− ρ)(1 − δ)
ℓ(t+k)∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
mjg
mjb
· q†
mj
b
We show the following three inequalities that when combined give the above inequality:
1
3
(1− ǫ)ǫ
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg
≥ 2(1 + ǫ)ρ
(1− ρ)(1− δ)
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
mjg
mjb
· q†
mj
b
(4)
1
3
(1− ǫ)ǫ
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg
≥ (1− ǫ)q†
m
ℓ(t)
g
(5)
1
3
(1− ǫ)ǫ
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg
≥ 2ρ
(1− ρ)(1− δ)
m
ℓ(t+k)
g
m
ℓ(t+k)
b
· q†
m
ℓ(t+k)
b
(6)
We first show inequality (4). By Lemma 8, we have 1
mjg
q†
mjg
≥ 12 · 1mj
b
q†
mj
b
for all j ∈ [ℓ(t)+1, ℓ(t+
k)− 1]. Inequality 4 then holds by the assumption that ρ ≤ ǫ(1−ǫ)(1−δ)(1−ρ)12(1+ǫ) .
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For inequalities (5) and (6), we first have
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
q†
mjg
≥ 1
n
q†n/2
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
mjg Lemma 8
≥ 1
n
q†n/2
(1− ρ)(1− δ)
2H
ℓ(t+k)−1∑
j=ℓ(t)+1
Ej Definition of Ej
≥ 1
n
q†n/2
(1− ρ)(1− δ)
2H
8
ǫ(1− ǫ)Emax Lower bound on k
≥
8q†n/2
ǫ(1− ǫ) Definition of Emax
≥ 4q
†
n
ǫ(1− ǫ) q
†
n/2 ≥ q†n/2
Inequality (5) then holds since q†n ≥ q†
m
ℓ(t)
g
. For inequality (6), note that
q†n ≥ q†mℓ(t+k)g ≥
1
2
m
ℓ(t+k)
g
m
ℓ(t+k)
b
· q†
m
ℓ(t+k)
b
where the second inequality is by Lemma 8 and that ρ ≤ ǫ(1−ǫ)(1−δ)(1−ρ)12(1+ǫ) .
Lemma 9. Any myopic buyer i playing an undominated strategy bids bi,t ≥ rb if its valuation is
vi,t > r
b in any round t of Bad-State-Auctions where i is in bad state.
Proof. Let B be the set of bad state buyers in a round t of Bad-State-Auctions of epoch ℓ. We
argue that for every myopic buyer i ∈ B that has private valuation vi,t > rb, bidding below rb is a
dominated strategy. A myopic buyer maximizes its utility in the current round t. With bid bi,t < r
b,
buyer i gets zero utility in round t. If vi,t > r
b, bidding bi,t < r
b is dominated by the strategy of
bidding bi,t = r
b, which always obtains non-negative utility in round t and obtains strictly positive
utility when other buyers bid below rb.
D Strategies of No-regret Buyers with Heterogeneous Learning
Behavior
Lemma 10. Every no-policy regret learner must remain in good state in all but o(T ) rounds.
Proof. Here, we use as benchmark expert strategy sg ∈ E of bidding rg = (1− ǫ)q†mg in good state
auctions whenever vi,t ≥ qmg initially, and bidding rg continuously once uncleared auctions reach
the limit (mgH/(1− δ)).
This bidding strategy ensures that the buyer is always in a good state, and achieves an expected
utility of at least ǫ(1 − ǫ)q†
mig
H during epoch i by Lemma 3. Since E = migH(1 + 11−δ ) 1(1−ρ) ≤
1
(1−ρ)(1−δ)2mgH, the expected per round utility is at least
(1− ρ)(1− δ)ǫ(1 − ǫ)q†
mig
2mig
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during that epoch, for some mig ∈ [n]. Therefore, since the class E contains such sequences of single
experts, the policy-regret learning buyer must achieve at least
(1−ρ)(1−δ)ǫ(1−ǫ)q†
mig
2mig
− o(1) utility per
round. Now, once in bad state, the buyer can achieve at most
ρq†
mi
b
mib
utility on average by Lemma 4 for some mib such that n/2 ≤ mbi ≤ n. By Lemma 8, for any mg,mb
such that 1 ≤ mg ≤ n and n/2 ≤ mb ≤ n, then 1mg q
†
mg ≥ 12 · 1mb q
†
mb .
Therefore, if ρ < (1−ρ)(1− δ)ǫ(1− ǫ)/4−Ω(1), then the number of bad state epochs in buyer’s
state trajectory can be at most o(T ). This implies that the learner remains in a good state for at
least T − o(T ) rounds.
We use the set of experts E as defined in Definition 10 in the lemmas below.
Lemma 11. Consider Γi as the set of rounds t where buyer i is participates in a bad state auction,
vi,t > pmb and bj,t < r
b for all other buyers j in bad state. If buyer i is a no-regret learner against
the set of experts E in Definition 10, then the buyer must bid bi,t ≥ rb for all but o(T ) of rounds in
Γi.
Proof. Consider a bidding expert function f(h, v) defined as f(h, v) = rb when the projected history
h indicates that the buyer is in the bad state and valuation v ≥ pmb ; and 0 otherwise. This is (or
is arbitrarily close in case of discretization) one of the experts in the class E of experts that the
buyer is using. Consider any round t where vi,t ≥ pmb . On bidding reserve price in this round,
if bids bj,t < r
b for all the other buyers, then this buyer wins the auction. For a given trajectory
of valuations, and other buyers’ bids, Γi denotes the set of such rounds in Bad-State-Auctions;
specifically, Γi = {t ∈ [T ] : t ∈ Eb for some epoch, i ∈ B (bad state), vi,t ≥ pmb , bj,t < rb, j 6= i}.
Therefore, the hindsight utility of this expert is at least
∑T
t=1 ui,t(f(hi,t−1, vi,t)) ≥
∑
t∈Γi
(vi,t − rb) ≥ |Γi| ǫnqn = Ω(|Γi|)
Since the buyer i is using a no-regret learning algorithm, she must be achieving a utility that
is within o(T ) of the above utility for every trajectory. Now, the buyer cannot make any positive
utility in a bad state in round t if bi,t ≤ rb. Therefore, on any given trajectory, a no-regret learning
buyer must have bid bi,t ≥ rb in all but o(T ) of rounds in Γi.
A corollary of the above lemma is that if all buyers are learning buyers at most o(T ) of bad
state auctions where some participating no-regret buyer has valuation above pmb can go uncleared.
Corollary 1. Consider the set of rounds among bad state auctions where all buyers in bad state
are no-regret learners against experts E, and at least one buyer in bad state has valuation of pmb
or more. Then, in all but o(T ) such rounds, at least one buyer i with vi,t ≥ pmb is guaranteed to
bid bi,t ≥ rb.
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E Proof of the Main Result
We prove the main result, which is a bound on the revenue obtained by the mechanism under a
heterogeneous buyer population consisting of an unknown proportion of k-lookahead buyers for
different k, myopic buyers, no-policy regret learners, and no-regret learners
Theorem 2. Let nsoph be the number buyers which are either k-lookahead, for k ≥ 10ǫ(1−ǫ)Emax, or
no-policy regret learners. Let nnaive be the number of remaining buyers which are either myopic
or no-regret learners. Assume Algorithm 1 is instantiated with parameters ρ, ǫ, δ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. ρ ≤
ǫ(1−ǫ)(1−δ)(1−ρ)
12(1+ǫ) . If the myopic and lookahead buyers play undominated strategies and the learners
play no-regret or no-policy regret strategies, then the expected per round revenue is at least
(1− ǫ)(1− δ)(1 − ρ)1
4
· q†nsoph +
ρ(1− ǫ)
2
(
1− 1
e
)
RevMye(nnaive)− o(1)
Here, q†n = Ev∼F [v|v ≥ qn], with qn = F−1(1 − 1/n) being the nth quantile for the valuation
distribution, and q†0 = 0. Rev
Mye(n) is the optimal revenue in a single-item auction with n buyers.
The following corollary can be obtained by simple algebraic manipulations of the result stated
in the above theorem.
Theorem 1. Assuming all myopic and k-lookahead buyers play undominated strategies, the expected
per round revenue of the mechanism described in Algorithm 1-3, with ǫ ∈ (0, 1), δ = ǫ, ρ ≤ ǫ(1−ǫ)412 ,
is at least
Θ(1)
(
q†nsoph +Rev
Mye(nnaive)
)
− o(1),
where nsoph, nnaive is the number of sophisticated and naive buyers, respectively. More precisely, the
expected per round revenue is at least
(1− ǫ)1
4
· q†nsoph +
ρ(1− ǫ)
2
(
1− 1
e
)
RevMye(nnaive)− o(1)
where q†n = Ev∼F [v|v ≥ qn], with qn = F−1(1 − 1/n) being the nth quantile for the valuation
distribution, and q†0 = 0. Rev
Mye(n) is the optimal revenue in a single-item auction with n buyers.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let nsoph be the number of buyers which are either k-lookahead with k ≥
10
ǫ(1−ǫ)Emax or no-policy regret learners and nnaive be the remaining buyers (myopic or no-regret
learner). We define R to be the collection of rounds where there is either a no-policy regret learner
that is in bad state, a no-regret learner that bids bi < r
b when vi > pmb .
Consider an epoch ℓ where none of the rounds during that epoch are in R and where no buyer
is moved from good state to bad state. Let |G| and |B| denote the number of good state and bad
state buyers in the beginning of this epoch.
By Lemma 5, all k-lookahead buyers (for k ≥ 10ǫ(1−ǫ)E) remain in good or rest state in all epochs.
Since none of the rounds during epoch ℓ are in R, every no-policy regret learner remains in good
state in epoch ℓ by definition of R. Therefore, |G| = nsoph + nnaive,g and |B| = nnaive − nnaive,g
for some nnaive,g ≥ 0. By Lemma 1, we get that the expected total revenue from Good-State-
Auctions in this epoch is at least |G|H(1 − ǫ)q†mg .
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For Bad-State-Auctions, we first recall that there is no-policy regret learner in bad state at
epoch ℓ. By Lemma 9, every myopic buyer bids at least rb if vi ≥ pmb during a round of Bad-
State-Auctions. By definition of R, ever no-regret learner bids at least rb if vi ≥ pmb during a
round of Bad-State-Auctions at epoch ℓ. by Lemma 2, the expected revenue of the mechanism
from Bad-State-Auctions at epoch ℓ is thus at least (1− ǫ)(1− 1/e) |B|mb ρERev
Mye(mb).
The expected total revenue from this epoch is thus at least
|G|H(1 − ǫ)q†mg + |B|(1− ǫ)
(
1− 1
e
)
ρERev
Mye(mb)
mb
To bound this expected revenue, we consider two cases.
If |B| ≥ n/2. In this case, mb = |B|. Since mg, |G| ≤ n/2 ≤ |B| = nnaive, we get
q†mg ≥
mg
nnaive
· q†nnaive ≥
mg
nnaive
RevMye(nnaive).
Since E = 2Hmg(1−δ)(1−ρ) and ρ =
ǫ(1−ǫ)(1−δ)(1−ρ)
12(1+ǫ) , this implies that
H(1− ǫ)q†mg ≥
(1− ǫ)(1− δ)(1 − ρ)E
2
· Rev
Mye(nnaive)
nnaive
≥ (1− ǫ)
(
1− 1
e
)
ρERev
Mye(nnaive)
nnaive
.
Next, since |B| = mb and nnaive ≥ |B|, we have
|B|Rev
Mye(mb)
mb
= RevMye(|B|) ≥ |B|
nnaive
RevMye(nnaive).
Since |G| ≥ |G|/2 + nnaive,g/2, we conclude that the total expected revenue from this epoch in this
case is at least
|G|
2
(1− ǫ)Hq†mg +
(nnaive,g
2
+ |B|
)
(1− ǫ)(1− 1
e
)
ρE
nnaive
RevMye(nnaive)
≥|G|
2
(1− ǫ)Hq†mg +
1
2
(1− ǫ)(1− 1
e
)ρE RevMye(nnaive)
where the inequality is since nnaive = nnaive,g + |B| ≤ 2(nnaive,g/2 + |B|).
If |B| < n/2. In this case, we have mg = |G| ≥ n/2 ≥ nnaive/2. Wet get
q†mg ≥ q†nnaive/2 ≥
1
2
q†nnaive ≥
1
2
RevMye(nnaive).
Since E = 2Hmg(1−δ)(1−ρ) and ρ = ǫ(1−ǫ)(1−δ)(1−ρ)12(1+ǫ) , this implies that
H(1− ǫ)q†mg ≥
1
4
(1− ǫ)(1− δ)(1 − ρ)E ·RevMye(nnaive) ≥ (1− ǫ)
(
1− 1
e
)
ρERevMye(nnaive).
Thus, the expected total revenue from this epoch in this case is at least
|G|(1 − ǫ)Hq†mg =
1
2
(1− ǫ)|G|Hq†mg +
1
2
(1− ǫ)|G|Hq†mg
≥ 1
2
(1− ǫ)|G|Hq†mg +
1
2
(1− ǫ)
(
1− 1
e
)
ρERevMye(nnaive)
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Since |G| ≥ nsoph, we have q†mg ≥ q†nsoph . Since E = 2Hmg(1−δ)(1−ρ) , in both cases, the expected per
round revenue of epoch ℓ is thus at least
(1− ǫ)(1 − δ)(1 − ρ)
4
q†nsoph +
1
2
(1− ǫ)
(
1− 1
e
)
ρRevMye(nnaive)
where q†nsoph = 0 if nsoph = 0
We considered an epoch ℓ where none of the rounds during that epoch are in R and where no
buyer was moved from good state to bad state. First, since once a buyer is moved to bad state
they remain in bad state for every future epoch, there are at most n epochs where a buyer is moved
from good state to bad state. We discount Emax ·max rg revenue for each of those n epochs. Second,
by Lemma 10 and 11, |R| = o(T ). Thus, the number of epochs where there is at least one round
during that epoch that is in R is o(T ). We discount Emax · max rg revenue for each of those o(T )
epochs. We obtain the lower bound on per-round revenue as stated in the theorem statement.
F Regarding Existence of Policy Regret Learning Algorithm
In general, achieving o(T ) policy regret is difficult; [ADT12] show that there exists an adaptive
adversary such that any learning algorithm has regret at least Ω(T ). However, it sufficient for
us to consider policy regret learners against a small set of experts E (e.g., O(1) size) and further
when other buyers are restricted to not use history beyond o(T ) past steps. Under such restrictions
a simple learning algorithm is to initially explores every expert for o(T ) steps and then use the
expert with best performance for remaining time steps. We can show that this simple learning
algorithm achieves o(T ) policy regret under our mechanism with a small modification of resetting
the mechanism once after o(T ) steps so that this initial exploration does not hurt buyer’s utility
in future rounds. This modification does not affect any of the revenue guarantees provided by our
mechanism. Further discussion is provided in Appendix E.
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